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Abstract
This paper examines the potential costs and benefits associated with a risk-sharing 
policy imposed on all higher education institutions. Under such a program, institutions 
would be required to pay for a portion of the student loans among which their students 
defaulted. I examine the predicted institutional responses under a variety of possible 
penalties and institutional characteristics using a straightforward model of institutional 
behavior based on monopolistic competition. I also examine the impact of a risk­
sharing program on overall economic efficiency by estimating the returns to scale for 
undergraduate enrollment (as well as other outputs) among each of ten educational 
sectors.
I find that even a relatively small incentive effect of a risk-sharing would lead to a 
substantial decline in overall student debt. There is considerable heterogeneity across 
sectors, with 4-year for-profit institutions accounting for the majority of the savings. My 
estimates suggest that a risk-sharing program would induce a modest tuition increase, 
but that there is unlikely to be a substantial loss of economic efficiency in terms of costs 
due to a reallocation of students across sectors.
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1 Introduction
With total student loan debt and default rates at or near all-time highs, it is more important 
than ever to understand the impact that the high debt burden (and policies aimed at reducing 
this burden) will have on individuals and on the higher education landscape. From the 
individual’s perspective, a high level of debt may delay or reduce financial self-sufficiency, 
which has implications for countless other markets such as housing, occupation choice, or 
marriage. Further, those with particularly high levels of debt may never realize a positive 
financial return on their investment in schooling. From a macroeconomic perspective, the 
approximately $1,2 trillion in outstanding debt from student loans (some economists go so 
far as to compare this to the real estate bubble which preceded the Great Recession) will 
impact the Federal budget for decades to come.
At the core of the problem is an increasing number of student loan defaults and delin­
quencies driven by rising tuition and poor initial job placements among recent graduates 
(the rate of defaults within 2 years of leaving school roughly doubled from 2004 to 2011), 
There is, of course, substantial heterogeneity in default rates across institutional character­
istics, ranging from a low of 7,2% among private non-profits to a high of almost 20% among 
private for-profit institutions. The prior figures have spurred a number of policy proposals 
aimed at ineentivising schools to reduce their student loan default rates. One such policy 
mandates that institutions to be ineligible for federal financial aid (such as Pell Grants) if 
their three-vear cohort default rates are above 30% for three consecutive years, or above 40% 
for one year. Due to the small number of schools actually impacted by this policy (Gross 
et ah, 2009), many have called for a higher bar (i.e, lower required default rates) in order to 
continue receiving federal funding. An obvious drawback to such a policy is the discontinuous 
nature of the punishment. Institutions which fall just over the required default rate will face 
a funding crisis, as federal aid is crucial to the operation of the vast majority of institutions. 
Similarly, students at these institutions will now be without a needed source of funding, even 
those for whom the education would have benefited, A second drawback is that this type
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of policy provides no incentives to improve student outcomes for those institutions not near 
the cutoff.
Another recently proposed policy to reduce defaults and overall student loan debt is to 
force schools to pay for a portion of the debt accrued by students who default on their student 
loans, also known as risk-sharing. While a policy of risk-sharing has received much less 
attention than federal aid eligibility cutoffs, it may be a theoretically more appealing option 
since it does not suffer from the drawbacks listed above. First, students are not deprived of 
the opportunity to receive federal funds or forced to attend a less conveniently located school 
(if one even exists). Second, replacing the sharp discontinuity with a smooth punishment 
function ineentivises all schools to lower their default rates, not just the worst offenders. 
There are, however, potential downsides which are shared by both policies. Institutions 
could pass additional costs onto students in the form of higher tuition and/or reduce the 
number of students admitted.
This paper evaluates the response of postsecondarv institutions to various risk-sharing 
policies both in terms of tuition and enrollment. This is accomplished by incorporating the 
parameters from cost function estimates into a simple model of university behavior based on 
monopolistic competition, I also present updated estimates of the returns to scale and scope 
among university outputs in order to look at a possible loss of allocative efficiency under a 
risk-sharing program,
I find that even under pessimistic assumptions about the degree of default reduction 
schools are able to achieve, a risk-sharing program could bring about a sizable reduction in 
total student loan debt. However, such savings would likely come at a cost of modestly higher 
tuition rates, a tradeoff which policymakers should consider when designing the program. 
Furthermore, I find no evidence that there would be a sizable loss of economic efficiency 
if students are induced to enter a different educational sector as a result of a risk-sharing 
program.
The paper is constructed as follows: Section 2 discusses the previous literature. Section
3
3 describes the data and empirical methodology used to estimate institutional cost functions 
and responses. Section 4 provides a discussion of the findings and their implications, and 
Section 5 concludes.
2 Previous Literature
This section presents a brief summary of the literatures which are touched on by this paper. 
For a broader overview of the higher education fiscal landscape, see Ehrenberg (2012) or 
Ehrenberg (2014).
A central focus of this paper is the estimation of cost functions among higher education 
institutions. The seminal paper in this literature is Cohn et al, (1989), the first study 
to estimate cost function parameters institutions of higher education and translate these 
parameters into the economically meaningful measures of economies of scale and scope, A 
number of studies have utilized the framework fromCohn et al, (1989) to provide similar 
measures for institutions in different countries or at different points in time (see Laband and 
Lentz (2003) or Sav (2011) to name just a few).
Since defaults on student loans are disproportionately concentrated among for-profit in­
stitutions, much of the political discussion surrounding defaults has focused on schools in 
that sector. While the literature which focuses specifically on for-profit institutions is still 
relatively small, primarily due to a lack of high-quality data, there are several recent excellent 
studies which examine multiple aspects of the for-profit sector,,
Cellini (2010) and Cellini and Goldin (2014) both illustrate the large role that federal 
student aid plays in the strategic decisions of for-profit institutions, Cellini (2010) finds that 
entry of new for-profit programs is directly tied to the availability and generosity of federal 
aid such as Pell Grants,Cellini and Goldin (2014) show that increases in the generosity of 
these programs leads to increases in tuition at for-profit institutions, a confirmation of the so-
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called “Bennett Hypothesis”, and important evidence which supports the model of institution 
behavior which is used in this paper.
Recent work also tends to find that the costs (Cellini, 2012) and benefits (Cellini and 
Chaudhary, 2014; Lang and Weinstein, 2013) of attending a for-profit college tend to be 
less favorable to students relative to other sectors. However, it is important to note there 
is selection along several dimensions into attending a for-profit university, and that not all 
groups have equal access to all educational sectors (Chung, 2012),
The current paper also has substantial overlap with the growing body of research on stu­
dent loans. For an excellent survey of both the practical and academic sides of student loans, 
see Avery and Turner (2012), The strand of this literature which deals with default rates 
is the most relevant to the current study, Dynarski (1994) and Hillman (2014) examine the 
characteristics which correlate with eventual default on their loans, finding unsurprisingly 
that borrowers from low-income households, college dropouts, and those with the lowest 
post-college earnings were the most likely to default on their student loans, Ionescu (2009) 
tests the impact of various student loan policies (e.g, repayment flexibility, eligibility require­
ments) on schooling decisions and default rates using a structural model of human capital 
accumulation.
3 Empirical Methodology
The goal of this study is to be able to predict how postsecondarv institutions would respond 
to various student loan risk-sharing policies. This is accomplished in two steps: 1) estimate 
cost function parameters to obtain a marginal cost curve for each institution, and 2) use 
the cost curve estimates in a simple model of monopolistic competition to predict what the 
institutional response would be to a risk-sharing policy (modeled as a change in costs). Each 
step is described in turn below.
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Cost Function Estimation
I estimate a panel data variant of the model originally estimated in Cohn et al, (1989), 
the seminal paper in the higher education cost function literature. Specifically, I estimate 
the following equation for each of ten institution types (Public Research, Private Research, 
Public Masters, Private Masters, Public 4-vear, Private 4-vear, Public 2-vear, Private 2-vear, 
For-profit 4-vear, and For-profit 2-vear),
Cit =  ao +  XitP +  X n  Yu, + (1/ 2) EE j  YijtYikt +  ^i +  Sit (1)
j k j
C represents the total cost expended by institution i at time t, X is a vector of control 
variables (the average instructor’s salary and year fixed effects), Y  represents the total value 
of outputs j and k (where j and k both index undergraduate enrollment, graduate enrollment, 
and a measure of external research output), ^i denotes institution fixed effects, and sit is the 
usual error term. The above formulation effectively forms a quadratic in each output, as well 
as interactions between each output pair1. Output categories were excluded from samples 
where all, or nearly all, institutions had no positive values of the output (e.g, research or 
graduate enrollment for community colleges).
The data for this study come from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 
(IPEDS), The analysis utilizes an unbalanced panel of institutions which cover the 1987-88 
to 2010-11 academic years. Undergraduate and graduate enrollment are measured in full­
time equivalent (FTE) students. Following Cohn et al, (1989), research output is measured 
as spending on external research administration.
While the main focus of this paper is not to generate estimates of institutional economies 
of scale and scope, these quantities are nonetheless useful when considering the optimal 
response to a change in costs. Following Cohn et al, (1989), I present updated estimates of 
ray economies of scale, product specific economies of scale, and economies of scope for each
1 Other parameterizations were tested, including a quartic in each output category and a translog cost 
function. Results are available upon request.
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of the ten institutional types studied. These quantities are defined as follows:
Ray Economies o f  Scale (at time t) Cit
P j M Cj x Outputjt (2)
Product Specif ic Economies o f  Scale ( for product j  at time t) Cit -  C - j
M Cj x Outputjt (3)
Cj +  c  - j  — Cu
Economies o f  Scope ( for product j  at time t) : — ----------------- (4)
Cit
Eav economies of scale represent the impact on cost of a proportional increase of all 
products (i.e. undergraduate teaching, graduate teaching, and research), and are equivalent 
to product specific economies in the ease of single-produet firms. In the notation above, 
quantities with a superscript j refer to the item specific to product j (e.g, the marginal cost 
of undergraduate teaching), and quantities with a superscript -j refer to the item specific 
to all products except j (e.g, the total cost of all products except graduate teaching). The 
quantities above are calculated based on the estimates from Equation (1),
Estimating Institutional Responses
To predict how institutions will respond to a program such as risk sharing, we must first 
posit a model for their optimal choice of output. In this paper, I assume that firms make 
decisions based on a simple model of monopolistic competition, where they choose output 
(e.g, undergraduate teaching) and price (tuition) based on marginal cost, marginal revenue, 
and demand.
At first glance, a model based on profit maximization may seem inappropriate for schools 
in the nonprofit sector. However, I assume that each institution’s current output and price
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combination represents an optimal allocation, and only assume that institutions will respond 
to small changes in costs in a profit-maximizing manner. In this way, my strategy makes 
no assumptions about what objective function institutions are attempting to maximize in 
a global sense (e.g. profit, prestige, research, school rank), but only assumes that they will 
respond to a small increase in costs in a way which minimizes the negative impact on their 
budgets. While the validity of this assumption still likely varies across institutional type, it 
is relatively unrestrietive in that many institutions are currently under substantial budgetary 
pressure and likely do take costs into account when making strategic decisions.
In a sense, assuming a model of monopolistic competition is akin to assuming that the 
“Bennett Hypothesis” holds. As noted above, the recent evidence is strongly in favor of this 
point among for-profit institutions (Cellini and Goldin, 2014), The evidence on other sectors 
of higher education still seems to support some degree of “Bennett Hypothesis” response, 
although the evidence is more mixed when examining in-state tuition at public universities 
(Long, 2004a; Stingell and Stone, 2007),
Based on the estimates from Equation (1), I can construct an approximation to the 
slope of each institution’s marginal cost curve by taking the twice differentiating the cost 
function with respect to undergraduate enrollment (the output which this paper will focus 
on). Constructing the marginal revenue and demand curves is a more difficult task with 
administrative data which does not allow me to observe student choice. Therefore, I present 
estimates for a variety of assumed demand elasticities which have been estimated in the 
literature. By assuming a given demand elasticity, the slope of the marginal revenue curve 
is implicitly determined.
Next, I assume that the level of undergraduate enrollment observed for a given institution 
and year is the level at which the estimated marginal cost curve intersects the marginal 
revenue curve. By combining the estimated slope of the marginal cost curve above with 
the assumed equilibrium, I am able to fully characterize the line. Further, I assume that 
the observed in-state tuition level is the point at which this observed level of undergraduate
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enrollment hits the demand curve.
In order to assess the response of the institution to a risk-sharing program, I then shift 
the marginal cost curve up according to the following equation:
M Cnew =  M C  +  riskpremium x %default x %loan x averageloan (5)
where M C  is the estimated marginal cost curve derived from Equation (1), riskpremium 
is the fraction of default costs the institution is asked to pay for, %default is the fraction 
of defaults observed at the institution (this is defined at the institution type level based on 
data from the Department of Education), %loan is the share of each institution’s students 
who receive student loans, and averageloan is the average dollar value of the loans held by 
students with a loan (the latter two variables are obtained from IPEDS), Finally, the new 
optimal undergraduate enrollment is calculated based on the intersection of the new marginal 
cost curve and the original marginal revenue curve, and the new tuition level is calculated 
based on where the new enrollment figure crosses the demand curve.
4 Results
Table 1 presents summary statistics for each of the ten institution types. All of the data 
come from IPEDS with the exception of the 3-vear default rate, which is obtained from the 
Department of Education at the institution-type level. The substantial differences among 
the observable eharaeteristies of institutions underscores the need to estimate all models 
separately by institution type. Of particular interest to this study are the differences in the 
student loan variables. The average loan amount at for-profit institutions is roughly double 
that of public institutions. The disparity grows even larger when taking into account that 
about four out of 5 students attending for-profit institutions receive student loans, while less 
than half of the student body at the typical public institution takes on debt (and only 11%
9
of students at public 2-vear schools). These figures are important for interpreting the results 
below.
Coefficient estimates and standard errors (clustered at the institution level) from Equa­
tion (1) run separately on each institution type are shown in Table 2, The model fit is 
fairly strong for most institution types, and does not change much when other more flex­
ible functional forms are utilized (e.g, quartie). Given that the focus of this paper is on 
predictions at individual institutions, a simpler functional form is actually preferable, since 
a quartie specification can lead to implausible responses for outlier institutions. While the 
estimates in Table 2 are not the focus of the paper (they are used to construct the marginal 
cost estimates), the results are in line with similar estimates from the prior literature (Cohn 
et ah, 1989; Laband and Lentz, 2003; Sav, 2011),
Table 3 presents estimates of rav/produet specific economies of scale and economies of 
scope for each institutional category. Each estimate represents the median institution’s 
degree of scale or scope economies; standard errors are generated by bootstrapping the cost 
function regressions and seale/seope calculations together,
A value of greater than one for either ray or product specific economies of scale implies 
increasing returns to scale, while a value of less than one implies diseconomies of scale. 
Economies (diseconomies) of scope exist when the estimate is positive (negative).
Several interesting results stand out from the scale and scope calculations. First, private 
(both for-profit and non-profit) tend to have larger scale economies than their public coun­
terparts, This is not at all surprising given the profit motives of for-profit institutions and 
the focus on small class sizes of private non-profits. Second, while not a perfect comparison, 
these estimates appear somewhat larger (greater economies of scale) than similar estimates 
using older data (Cohn et ah, 1989; Laband and Lentz, 2003) despite considerable growth in 
enrollments. Anecdotally, this may be attributed to technological advances such as online 
learning, I am not aware of any work which rigorously examines the causes of such changes 
in cost structure over time, but it appears to be a potentially interesting question for future
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research.
Tables 4-6 show the predicted results of a risk-sharing program where the institution 
must pay for 20% or 50% of its students’ defaults. Table 4 presents the results when the 
assumed demand elasticity is ,1, Table 5 presents the results when the elasticity is ,3, and 
Table 6 assumes an elasticity of ,5, These elasticities approximately correspond to the low, 
middle, and high end of tuition elasticities estimated in the literature, see Long (2004b) 
for an excellent example of how such elasticities can be estimated using detailed individual- 
level data. The predictions are generated using data only from the most recent survey 
year (Academic Year 2010-2011), The standard errors for each prediction are obtained by 
bootstrapping the regressions and response models together.
The first row of each panel shows the median predicted increase in annual in-state tuition 
(in constant 2014 dollars). The largest increases, as would be expected, are seen in the 
institutions with the highest default rates, loan amounts, and prevalence of loans. Focusing 
on Table 5, tuition at for-profit institutions would be expected to rise by $165 per year for 
the typical institution under a 20% risk-sharing plan (1-2%), or between $400-$500 under a 
50% risk-sharing system (3-4%), For all other institution types, the tuition hikes would be 
considerably smaller, rarely exceeding 2% even under 50% risk-sharing
The third row presents the expected decline in the entering cohort summed up over all 
institutions within an institution-type, A 20% risk sharing system is expected to reduce 
hrst-vear cohorts at for-profit institutions by 14,000-15,000 students annually, substantially 
greater than the loss of about 400 students combined at public and private PhD institutions. 
From a policy perspective, the loss of college graduates is likely of greater importance 
than the reduction of entering cohorts, these figures are presented in the fifth row of each 
panel. The model estimates suggest that 2,254 four-year degrees and 4,466 2-vear degrees 
would be lost annually among for-profit institutions under the 20% risk sharing system (5,636 
and 11,166 under the 50% rule). However, these figures essentially assume that institutions 
would reduce their enrollment in a fashion which is uneorrelated with the likelihood of grad -
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uation. Given that eventual default is most likely negatively correlated with the likelihood of 
graduate, institutions would be ineentivised to target their enrollment cutbacks at students 
who are highly unlikely to graduate, and thus these figures represent upper bounds.
Finally, the seventh row in each panel calculates the total student loan debt which would 
be saved annually by a risk-sharing program. The for-profit sector would account for about 
$13 million in lower student debt under a 20% risk-sharing plan, or up to $80 million under 
the 50% proposal, far outpacing other sectors (assuming a tuition elasticity of ,3),
The predictions up to this point have made the (hopefully) unreasonable assumption that 
institutions would make no efforts to reduce defaults, and would instead respond only by re­
optimizing their tuition and enrollment levels, A more realistic assumption might be a small 
(10%) drop in default rates by investing more heavily in students’ post-graduation outcomes, 
or at the very least by not recruiting students who are highly unlikely to benefit from a college 
education (and thus will have trouble repaying the debt they incur). Table 7 reports the 
same predicted outcomes from Tables 4-6, but with the assumption that default rates are 
lowered by ten percent. By assuming a lower default rate, the costs to each institution are 
lower, and thus the tuition and enrollment responses are less severe. Although the savings in 
total student loan debt are considerably larger ($42 million annually under 20% risk-sharing 
and $130 million under 50% risk-sharing among the for-profit sector).
One potential worry of any intervention is that there may be a loss of overall economic 
efficiency. Given that the above results imply that for-profit institutions, particularly 4-vear 
for-prohts, may see moderate enrollment declines, it is worth asking whether a risk-sharing 
program might push students into a sector where they are more costly to educate, Turing 
back to Table 3, we see that this is unlikely to be the ease. The returns to scale at a 4-vear 
for-profit are virtually the same as at 4-vear private non-profits, and the returns to scale are 
greater at public 2-vear institutions than at for-profit 2-vear schools.
So is a risk-sharing program a good idea? The answer depends on how much institutions 
will focus on reducing student defaults due to the new incentives and the type of student
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who is likely to be pushed out of higher education as a result. The above results imply that 
even a relatively modest improvement in default rates would make the program a sensible 
one. While there is no way to know for sure that this type of behavior would occur, we 
can look at the implementation of stricter default standards in 1991 as a guide. Only the 
worst institutional offenders were punished with a loss of federal financial aid (default rates 
greater than 30%) as a result of the 1991 law change, but this also means that only a subset 
of schools faced any change in incentives whatsoever (a school with a 20% default rate had 
no incentive to change their behavior because they were not close to the threshold). Average 
3-vear cohort default rates dropped from 22.4% in 1990 to 15% in 1992 (a 33% drop!) and 
continued to decline over the next several years.
The downside to such a program is apparent from the above results, a potential reduction 
in college graduates and an increase in tuition. While there would almost certainly be 
some reduction in college graduates from a risk-sharing program, there are many reasons to 
believe the overall impact would be small. Non-profit institutions, particularly public 2-vear 
institutions, would likely absorb many students displaced from their for-profit counterparts 
since their goal is definitionally not profit-maximization. Furthermore, there is substantial 
evidence that many students do not actually receive a financial benefit from going to college 
when balanced against the explicit tuition cost and the opportunity cost of time spent out 
of the labor force (Webber, 2015), Assuming that a disproportionate share of those who 
fail to enroll in higher education as a result risk-sharing would not actually benefit from the 
experience in the long run, then this negative aspect is less of a eoneern.
However, tuition increases are a much greater eoneern if some sort of risk-sharing program 
is implemented. Given the substantial increase in tuition over the past several decades, 
policymakers must be mindful of any additional cost pressure which is put on postsecondary 
institutions. Fortunately, since a risk-sharing program will save money, these funds could 
be reinvested in institutions which achieve low default rates, putting downward pressure on 
ballooning tuition.
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5 Conclusion
As student loan debt continues to rise, a wide variety of policies aimed at reducing student 
debt and default rates have been proposed. This paper seeks to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of one such proposal, often referred to as risk-sharing. Under a risk-sharing program, 
postsecondary institutions would be obligated to pay for a portion of the debt which is 
defaulted on by their students. In contrast to current regulations involving default rates 
which are only binding for schools with very high default rates, a risk-sharing program 
would ineentivise all institutions to reduce their default rates.
This paper examines the potential response of institutions to the introduction of risk­
sharing under a variety of scenarios involving the magnitude of institutional penalties and 
the tuition elasticity of demand, I find that even a small degree of improvement in default 
rates (10%) would lead to considerable savings in national student loan debt, with the bulk 
of the gains coming from 4-vear for-profit institutions. Tuition increases are likely to be 
modest at most schools based on the results of this analysis, but policymakers should be 
aware that risk-sharing would put positive pressure on tuition rates. Furthermore, I find no 
evidence that there would be a sharp decline in overall cost efficiency in the event that a 
risk-sharing program induced students to enroll in a different educational sector.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Public PhD Private PhD Public Masters Private Masters Public 4-yr Private 4-yr Public 2-yr Private 2-yr For-Profit 4-yr For-profit 2-yr
Undergraduate Enrollment 17787 6974 5822 2005 2323 1073 2235 224 465 170
Graduate Enrollment 3993 2660 949 500
Research Exp. (SMillions) 57.3 11.7
Average Faculty Exp. 55961 70554 58082 51802 52742 49840 57878 48957 32607 27800
Graduation Rate .553 .724 .424 .542 .369 .551 .224 .516 .38 .628
% Students with loan .44 .54 .49 .69 .50 .67 .11 .59 .82 .76
Average loan amount 3939 5270 3432 4779 3517 4347 2713 3979 6885 5109
Annual In-state Tuition 4284 22863 3590 15750 3138 15612 2013 9075 12397 9600
% Default within 3 years* .089 .074 .089 .074 .089 .074 .171 .185 .186 .202
#  Institutions 155 103 236 331 100 509 867 102 514 884
Total observations 3,461 2,259 5,232 6,796 2,033 10,890 18,153 1,528 4,746 4,852
*The default rates are obtained from the Department of Education at the institution-type level, 
and thup_do not vary across schools of the same type. The default rates for 2 year institutions are 
the average between reported rates for less-than-2-year and 2-3 year institutions. Each cell 
represents the median value of the variable for each institution type.
Table 2: Cost Regressions
Public PhD Private PhD Public Masters Private Masters Public 4-yr Private 4-yr Public 2-yr Private 2-yr For-Profit 4-yr For-profit 2-yr
Under 13,631*** 16,958** 8,840*** 8,107*** -6,342 7,248*** 6,377*** 8,044*** 5,476*** 9,186***
(2,470) (7,831) (926.4) (1,386) (5,642) (1,006) (420.3) (2,064) (1,147) (1,085)
Under2 -0.0509 -0.847 0.0811* 0.578*** 1.186** -0.0996* 0.0915*** 1.132*** 0.00436 -0.744***
(0.181) (1.018) (0.0426) (0.222) (0.474) (0.0534) (0.0308) (0.356) (0.00626) (0.206)
Grad 12,039** 3,668 2,598 2,556
(5,214) (12,844) (1,710) (1,573)
Grad2 1.670 2.693 -0.0333 0.909***
(1.738) (2.626) (1.040) (0.303)
Research 1.520*** 1.561***
(0.211) (0.567)
Research2 -2.33e-09*** -1.17e-09**
(7.98e-10) (5.72e-10)
i_i Under*Grad -2.199** -1.365 0.0221 -1.962***
(0.940) (3.184) (0.416) (0.503)
Under*Research 3.64e-05** 0.000178**
(1.48e-05) (8.87e-05)
Grad*Research 0.000161*** -2.39e-05
(3.03e-05) (0.000102)
Faculty Salary 12.55 32.61 12.86 12.01 -5.255* 4.995** 11.03*** 0.102 7.584 2.557**
(8.862) (155.6) (9.163) (9.708) (3.164) (2.225) (2.758) (0.127) (6.792) (1.082)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Institution FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,461 2,259 5,232 6,796 2,033 10,890 18,153 1,528 4,746 4,852
R-squared 0.899 0.841 0.782 0.605 0.295 0.438 0.640 0.666 0.894 0.379
Public PhD Private PhD Public Masters Private Masters Public 4-yr Private 4-yr Public 2-yr Private 2-yr For-Profit 4-yr For-profit 2-yr
Table 3: Economies of Scale and Scope
Ray Economies of Scale 1.309 1.121 1.339 1.855
(.0869) (.1361) (.0521) (.0815)
:onomies of Scale (IJndergrad) 1.258 .8580 .4907 .9659 .2296 2.667 1.518 1.621 2.614 1.238
(.4839) (.4925) (.0695) (.0958) (2.813) (.114) (.0549) (.4256) (.3691) (.0839)
conomies of Scale (Graduate) 2.367 4.145 30.83 -18.56
(2.559) (1.753) (14.67) (7.936)
conomies of Scale (Research) 1.24 1.6005
(.1508) (.4946)
onomies of Scope (Undergrad) .1346 .0083 -.0009 .050
(.0977) (.1170) (.0183) (.0083)
;onomies of Scope (Graduate) .1229 .0823 -.0009 .0500
(.0748) (.1085) (.0183) (.0083)
conomies o^_Scope (Research) -.1240 -.0536
(.0254) (.019)
Table 4: Response to Risk-Sharing (Demand Elasticity=.l)
Public PhD Private PhD Public Masters Private Masters Public 4-yr Private 4-yr Public 2-yr Private 2-yr For-Profit 4-yr For-profit 2-yr
Risk-sharing=.2
Change in tuition 28 32 30 37 26 35 22 74 165 139
(1) (2) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (5) (2) (5)
Decrease in lst-yr cohort 108 23 173 79 60 97 357 276 2160 2292
(9) (27) (13) (50) (6) (114) (86) (68) (136) (152)
Decrease in graduates 61 16 78 43 23 51 89 157 752 1249
(5) (18) (6) (28) (2) (60) (22) (37) (57) (78)
Decrease in debt 36386 30473 64034 131673 23721 183319 155409 140079 2778659 1484129
(3671) (4423) (5449) (6821) (3427) (9489) (9883) (20286) (108785) (101313)
Risk-sharing=.5
Change in tuition 70 81 75 94 66 89 55 185 413 347
(2) (8) (2) (1) (3) (1) (2) (15) (5) (11)
Decrepe in lst-yr cohort 270 58 432 198 151 242 893 690.4843 5402 5730
CO
(20) (70) (32) (91) (14) (231) (197) (152) (402) (346)
Decrease in graduates 152 40 197 109 58 129 222 394 1880 3123
(12) (48) (15) (50) (6) (124) (51) (89) (159) (196)
Decrease in debt 195071 168516 347869 727614 127868 1014881 847750 823687 1.68e+07 8632960
(16905) (25873) (28384) (42790) (17476) (62025) (67585) (122681) (769339) (618897)
Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping Equation (1), Equation (5), and the process 
described in the Empirical Methodology section together. The first row in each panel represents 
the median predicted increase in tuition. The third and fifth rows present the total loss in 
first-year enrollment and expected college graduates summed over all institutions within each 
sector. The seventh row reports the expected savings in student loan debt calculated by adding the 
institional penalty for defaults and the debt which is saved by lower enrollments.
Table 5: Response to Risk-Sharing (Demand Elasticity=.3)
Public PhD Private PhD Public Masters Private Masters Public 4-yr Private 4-yr Public 2-yr Private 2-yr For-Profit 4-yr For-profit 2-yr
Risk-sharing=.2
Change in tuition 28 40 29 33 21 36 21 61 165 165
(1) (11) (1) (1) (2) (1) (1) (10) (2) (13)
Decrease in lst-yr cohort 328 86 511 214 150 297 1053 688 6476 8194
(32) (143) (36) (128) (21) (372) (217) (163) (483) (780)
Decrease in graduates 185 59 233 118 58 158 262 393 2254 4466
(17) (97) (17) (70) (9) (198) (53) (101) (190) (428)
Decrease in debt 92769 96493 161807 312750 50693 489310 393790 328574 8027464 4864484
(10726) (28539) (13263) (21229) (8948) (28396) (22216) (60041) (427280) (473525)
Risk-sharing=.5
Change in tuition 71 100 74 84 54 91 54 153 412 414
(3) (34) (2) (3) (4) (2) (1) (27) (5) (31)
D e c r e e  in lst-yr cohort 821 216 1277 535 375 742 2633 1721 16192 20486
o
(69) (296) (91) (453) (51) (1010) (530) (421) (1288) (1587)
Decrease in graduates 462 149 582 296 146 396 656 983 5636 11166
(38) (207) (45) (251) (21) (539) (128) (256) (505) (869)
Decrease in debt 547469 581138 958947 1859345 296446 2927325 2337635 2001786 4.96e+07 2.98e+07
(52139) (208901) (84807) (147036) (55326) (156261) (123912.6) (437334) (2537678) (2450506)
Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping Equation (1), Equation (5), and the process 
described in the Empirical Methodology section together. The first row in each panel represents 
the median predicted increase in tuition. The third and fifth rows present the total loss in 
first-year enrollment and expected college graduates summed over all institutions within each 
sector. The seventh row reports the expected savings in student loan debt calculated by adding the 
institional penalty for defaults and the debt which is saved by lower enrollments.
Table 6: Response to Risk-Sharing (Demand Elasticity=.5)
Public PhD Private PhD Public Masters Private Masters Public 4-yr Private 4-yr Public 2-yr Private 2-yr For-Profit 4-yr For-profit 2-yr
Risk-sharing=.2
Change in tuition 28 51 29 30 18 37 21 52 164 205
(2) (541) (1) (1) (2) (1) (1) (12) (2) (43)
Decrease in lst-yr cohort 553 187 838 325 213 505 1725 981 10785 16896
(48) (6967) (52) (200) (38) (515) (423) (308) (755) (3280)
Decrease in graduates 311 128 382 179 82 269 430 560 3754 9210
(26) (4823) (25) (111) (15) (279) (106) (187) (282) (1786)
Decrease in debt 150331 201311 256530 461331 69634 808137 623832 462557 1.33e+07 9848272
(14455) (2128019) (19346) (43675) (12610) (49939) (37328) (108566) (734915) (1957362)
Risk-sharing=.5
Change in tuition 72 129 73 77 46 93 53 131 412 513
(6) (443) (3) (3) (8) (2) (1) (39) (7) (98)
D e c r e e  in lst-yr cohort 1382 467 2096 812 533 1263 4312 2453 26963 42241
h—1
(165) (2126) (126) (695) (101) (1625) (1053) (729) (2472) (7513)
Decrease in graduates 779 322 956 449 207 674 1075 1402 9386 23025
(95) (1478) (58) (389) (38) (868) (275) (426) (901) (4275)
Decrease in debt 907230 1236258 1550969 2787977 414825 4919993 3775398 2839178 8.24e+07 6.09e+07
(115675) (3844087) (111490) (230218) (94729) (258830) (258929) (764441) (5011809) (1.10e+07)
Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping Equation (1), Equation (5), and the process 
described in the Empirical Methodology section together. The first row in each panel represents 
the median predicted increase in tuition. The third and fifth rows present the total loss in 
first-year enrollment and expected college graduates summed over all institutions within each 
sector. The seventh row reports the expected savings in student loan debt calculated by adding the 
institional penalty for defaults and the debt which is saved by lower enrollments.
Table 7: Response to Risk-Sharing (Demand Elasticity=.3, Defaults Reduced by 10%)
Public PhD Private PhD Public Masters Private Masters Public 4-yr Private 4-yr Public 2-yr Private 2-yr For-Profit 4-yr For-profit 2-yr
Risk-sharing=.2
Change in tuition 23 32 24 27 17 29 17 49 133 134
(1) (8) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (7) (1) (11)
Decrease in lst-yr cohort 266 70 413 173 121 240 853 557 5246 6637
(20) (77) (24) (86) (13) (288) (180) (126) (366) (643)
Decrease in graduates 154 49 195 98 49 131 237 336 2003 3842
(11) (55) (11) (50) (5) (158) (53) (78) (164) (390)
Decrease in debt 15990260 4449106 9414291 7023420 1511678 4507397 1.27e+07 660429 3.55e+07 6908762
(1366743) (530557) (739242) (474896) (158294) (267076) (818269) (92627) (8774235) (477185)
Risk-sharing=.5
Change in tuition 57 81 60 68 44 74 43 124 334 335
(2) (36) (1) (1) (4) (1) (1) (19) (5) (26)
D e c r e e  in lst-yr cohort 665 175 1034 433 304 601 2133 1394 13115 16593
to
(54) (242) (74) (372) (29) (545) (414) (304) (919) (1435)
Decrease in graduates 385 123 487 245 122 328 594 840 5009 9606
(33) (170) (38) (213) (13) (300) (119) (193) (383) (900)
Decrease in debt 4.02e+07 1.13e+07 2.39e+07 1.82e+07 3879408 1.23e+07 3.25e+07 2348058 1.06e+08 2.77e+07
(4007171) (1476842) (1830645) (1028977) (397320) (617440) (2473291) (329833) (2.14e+07) (1946011)
Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping Equation (1), Equation (5), and the process 
described in the Empirical Methodology section together. The first row in each panel represents 
the median predicted increase in tuition. The third and fifth rows present the total loss in 
first-year enrollment and expected college graduates summed over all institutions within each 
sector. The seventh row reports the expected savings in student loan debt calculated by adding the 
institional penalty for defaults and the debt which is saved by lower enrollments.
